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Apprendi and the Dynamics of Guilty Pleas 
Stephanos Bibas* 
Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein devote most of their  Commentary 
to a single subsection of my recent article. I My entire miicle argued that 
Apprendi v. Nevv Jersey2 exempli fied criminal procedure's misguided focus on 
jury trials at the expense of the real world of guilty pleas. Professors King and 
Klein focus on my narrower point that Apprendi undercuts due process by 
making it  harder for many defendants to secure judicial hearings after they 
plead guilty. In summary, I argued that defendants used to be able to get the 
massive benefits of pleading guilty while still enjoying enhancement hearings 
at sentencing. Now that enhancements are issues for jury trials, defendants 
cannot gain both benefits. They must either allocute to and concede these 
enhancement issues to gain guilty-plea benefits or go to trial on enhancement 
issues and forfeit these plea benefits. Professors King and Klein claim that 
defendants face no additional pressure to give up hearings under this scheme. 
But they fail to see how prosecutorial and judicial behavior reinforce the 
pressures to plead guilty, making hearings harder to secure for many 
defendants. 
First, they note that even before Apprendi prosecutors had the same 
bargaining chips to induce guilty pleas.3 Both before and after Apprendi, 
defendants who pleaded guilty enjoyed 35% sentence reductions for accepting 
responsib ility, could avoid recidivism and perjury enhancements, and could 
gain other benefits as welJ.4 What Professors King and Klein miss is that 
Apprendi has changed the worth of these bargaining chips. Before Apprendi, 
prosecutors could use these bargaining chips to force guilty pleas. s But 
* Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (bibas@philo.org). B.A., 
Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford; J.D., Yale. I am indebted to George Fisher and Dan 
Richman for their comments on an earlier draft. 
I. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bwgaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
295 (a comment in this issue responding 10 Stephanos Bibas, Judicial FoCI-Finding ond 
Senrence Enhoncements in a 1-Vor/d o/"GuiltF Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, especially 1152-67 
(200 i )) 
I 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
·'. King & Klein, supm note I, at 297 & n.l6. 
4. See Bibas. supra note I, at 1153-54. 
' Professors King and Klein assume that rational prosecutors would simply usc these 
chips to push for the highest possible sentences in all cases. See King & Klein, supm note I, 
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defendants could reap the benefits of pleading guilty while still getting 
enhancement hearings at sentencing. Now, however, enhancements are 
elements of the offense. Pressure to plead guilty simultaneously pressures 
defendants to give up enhancement issues. To this extent, defendants lose 
hearing rights and are worse off .  
Professors King and Klein object to my considering the possibility of 
guilty pleas, without plea agreements, followed by sentencing hearings, as  most 
at 296. This assumption ignores my point that prosecutors seek not only to maximize 
sentences, but also to minimize trials and workloads by trading lower sentences for pleas. 
See George Fisher, Plea B argaining ·s Triumph, I 09 YALE L.J. 857 , 865, 882-83 , 893-903 
(2000). Thus, even if the prosecution has a good shot of winning at trial, it may not press 
ceriain enhancements against a defendant who would otherwise plead guilty because the 
threat of a huge enhancement may induce the defendant to try to avoid the enhancement by 
rolling the dice at trial. And in many cases, the prosecution's only options are to press the 
entire enhancement (forcing a trial) or drop it entirely (in return for a plea). Massive 
enhancements (such as recidivism enhancements) are so large and discrete that they operate 
as sledgehammers, not scalpels. They can be traded off to prevent trials but cannot be 
parceled out more finely to tailor the terms of a pariicular plea. See Bibas, supra note I, at 
I 153-54 n.342 . 
Professors King and Klein further suggest that the parties may avoid most of the costs 
of trial by agreeing to expedited bench trials on enhancements. King & Klein. supra note I, 
at 306 n.42. While this procedural vehicle may eventually evolve, by and large it has not 
done so yet, and prosecutors have little incentive to make it easier for defendants to secure 
hearings. More hearings would give judges more opponunities to check prosecutorial 
charging and plea decisions, which judges and defendants might favor but prosecutors would 
not. In the federal system, 28 states, and the District of Columbia, prosecutors can 
unilaterally veto bench trials and thwari this maneuver. Bibas, supra note I, at 1155 n.346 
(also noting that a 29th state forbids bench trials entirely regardless of the panics' consent). 
Finally, Professors King and Klein claim that the Depanment of Justice's Thornburgh 
memorandum prevents prosecutors from forgoing readily provable enhancements. King & 
Klein, supro note 1, at 297 n. l8. When Janet Reno succeeded William BarT as Attomcy 
General, however, she promulgated furiher guidance to federal prosecutors that gave them 
more leeway in deciding which charges to press. See Memorandum from Attorney General 
Janet Reno to all Holders of U.S. Attorney's Manual (Reno Blueshect on Charging and Plea 
Decisions), Oct. 12, 1993 , reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCTNG REP. 352 ( 1994 ) (endorsing plea 
bargaining "on the basis of an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular 
charges fit the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the 
federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of federal resources on crime"). Compare 
this with UNTTED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL� 9-27 .400 (!999 ); Professors King and 
Klein, at p.3 n.l8, quote the manual as saying that prosecutors should not bargain away 
readily provable charges, but they fail to note an exception in the same section that allows 
supervisors to approve charge bargaining for other reasons, such as lightening a heavy 
prosecutorial workload. And whatever the fom1al doctrine on paper, prosecutors do in 
practice take into account their caseloads and trial burdens in their charging and plea 
decisions. Sec .Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad J-/oc ?leo Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695. 707-10 
(2001) (summarizing various empirical studies, all of which found that bans on plea 
bargaining broke down, and suggesting that plea bargaining may be inevitable); Robc11 A. 
\Veninger, The Aholi1ion ol Plea Bargaining: A Cosr: Stud\' oj E! Paw CountY, Tc.ws. 35 
UCLA L. REV. 265. 265, 31 -13 ( 1987) (noting that empirical study showed that plea 
b:1rgaining resurfaced in one county despite an official ban and suggesting that evidence 
shows that bargaining is inevitable regardless of official policy). 
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i ssues are resolved as part of plea bargains and so actual sentencing hearings 
are uncommon.6 Thi s objection misses my point. Before Apprendi, defendants 
had the realistic option of pleading guilty without agreements and insisting on 
enhancement hearings at sentencing. Plea b argaining took place i n  the shadow 
of thi s option, forcing prosecutors to provide additional consideration and strike 
reasonable deals in retum for waivers of these real istic hearing rights. 
Prosecutors bad to purchase these waivers, so the rights led prosecutors to 
make lower plea offers, even when defendants ultimate�v did not exercise these 
rights. This option, however, i s  foreclosed by Apprendi. In exchange for 
taking away these realistic hearing rights, it gave defendants theoretical jury­
trial rights that they cannot afford to exercise lest they forfeit the benefits of 
pleading guilty. Prosecutors know that for most defendants the threat of going 
to trial is implausible, so these trial r ights do not cast serious shadows over 
most plea bargaining. Knowing that judges have much less power to check 
their bargains, prosecutors can now drive harder bargains. 7 
Professors King and Klein respond that after Apprendi defendants could 
plead guilty to base offenses or offer to do so, reaping the benefits of pleas 
while still enjoying trials on enhancements. Prosecutors need not charge lesser­
included offenses, however, and courts are unlikely to let defendants plead 
guilty to lesser-included offenses if prosecutors have not charged them8 Tnte, 
one circuit has granted acceptance-of-responsibility credit to a defendant who 
offered to plead guilty to two base offenses, was convicted at trial, and was 
sentenced based on exactly the drug quantity to which he had offered to plead 
guilty_9 Three other circuits have taken a contrary approach, however. tO And 
6. King & Klein, supru note 1, at 297 n.l4, 298 n.l9. 
7. Bibas. supm note I, at 1159-60, 1165. 
8. Though I have found no law on this precise point, the closest analogue is most 
courts' refusal to give lesser-included offense instructions in non-capital cases unless 
prosecutors have chosen to charge the lesser-included offenses. See Michael G. Pattillo, 
Note. When "Lesser" Is More: The Casefor Reviving the Cvnsrirurionol Righr to o Lesser 
Included Offense. 77 TEX. L. REV. 429, 453-59 ( 1998) (noting that a plurality of federal 
circuits have rejected any right to lesser-included-offense instructions in non-capital cases 
and only one circuit has embraced such a right across the board). 
9. See United States v. Guerrero-Cortez, I 10 F.3d 647. 653-56 (8th Cir. 1997). The 
second case cited by Professors King and Klein, United States v. McKinney. 15 F.3d 849, 
851-54 (9th Cir. 1994 ), is inapposite. It involved no issues of base offenses versus enhanced 
offenses or quanti ties. but simply a confused, contrite defendant who merited acceptance-of­
responsibility credit because (I) the court had prevented him from pleading guilty, (2) he had 
made a full confession right after an·cst, (3) he had assisted the authorities, and (4) he had 
put on a "'minimal and perfunctory'' defense at trial. In addition, after McKinne1' the 
Sentencing Commission amended the relevant Sentencing Guidelines commentary. The 
amended language draws a clear distinction between defendants who go to trial and those 
who plead guilty. and it forbids acceptance-of-responsibility credit for those who contest 
factual guilt at trial. See United States v. Dia, 69 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir. I 995) 
(distinguishing McKinne1· on this and other grounds). 
10. E.g . . United States v. McLaurin. 57 F.3d 823.827-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
district court did not err in denying acceptance-of-responsibility credit to defendant who had 
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the federal Sentenc ing Guidelines commentary denies acceptance-of­
responsibility credit to defendants who deny "the essential factual elements of 
guilt" at trial.11 Perhaps other courts will refuse to apply this plain language to 
enhancement trials or the Sentencing Commission will amend it; perhaps not. 
Even if defendants do get acceptance-of-responsibility credit, judges still have 
discretion to sentence within the resulting ranges. In practice, j udges sentence 
leniently those who plead guilty and spare the courts trials, while being harsher 
on those who i nsist on trials.12 In short, defendants must now forfeit at least 
some of the benefits of pleading guilty if they want hearings on enhancements 
at trial. Apprendi forces defendants onto the horns of this dilemma. 
Professors King and Klein fmiher claim that my example of federal drug 
sentencing is atypical of the criminal justice system, though more than a third 
of federal inmates are charged with drug crimes.I3 It is true that peculiar 
features of the federal dntg laws and guidelines (such as relevant conduct, 
mandatory minima, and recidivism enhancements) exacerbate the Apprendi 
problem. But the root of the problem lies not in these features, but in the 
offered to plead guilty to the only count on which he was eventually convicted. where 
defendant did not actually make a pre-trial confession to all of the clements of that ol"knse; 
distinguishing Mr.: Kinney as turning on McKinney's confession upon arrest and repeated 
expressions of contrition): United States v. Clark, 25 F.3d 1051 (table), No. 93-141S. !994 
WL 194286, at *3 (6th Cir. May 16, 1994) (unpublished per curiam) (holding that defendant 
who had offered to plead guilty to all of the charges of which he was ultimately convicted 
was not entitled to acceptance-of-responsibility credit and \Vould not have been entitled to 
this credit automatically even if he had entered guilty pleas); see also United States v. Best. 
139 F.3d 908 (table), No. 97-30172, 1998 U.S. App. LEX!S 1875, at *8 (9th Cir. Feb. l), 
1998) (unpublished per curiam memorandum opinion) (holding that defendant's timely otTer 
to plead and eventual guilty plea did not entitle defendant to full three-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility. where defendant balked at allocuting to the full loss amount 
that judge ultimately found at sentencing hearing): United States v. Jones. �99 F.2d I U97. 
1100-0 I (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that concession of guilt of the only offense of which 
defendant \Vas ultimately convicted did not entitle defendant to acceptance-of-responsibility 
reduction, where district court could have discounted this concession as a trial tactic rather 
than a sincere expression of remorse), overruled in pori on other grounc/1· by United States v. 
Morrill, 984 F.2d I 136, 113 7 ( II th C ir. i 993) (en bane: per curiam). 
II. U.S. SENTENCINC; GUIDELINES MANUAL� 3E 1.1 cmt. n.2 (2000). 
12. Gerald W. Heaney, The Recilit1· of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disporit\. 2X 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 170 nn.28. 29 ( 1991) (summarizing empirical study of Guide] ines 
sentencing, which showed that judges arc more likely to sentence those who plcmi guilty at 
the bottom of the sentencing range and are more likely to sentence those who go to trial at 
the top of the sentencing range). Judges might come to see how Apprendi hurts defendants' 
hearing rights. They might compensate by signaling that they will be more lenient on 
defendants who go to trial simply to have hearings on enhancements. Bibas, supm note i. at 
1153 n.34 L I 154 n.345. But as long as judges accept the conventions I 1visdom th;u 
Apprendi is an unalloyed good for defendants, they will likely resent defendants who insist 
on enhancement trials. 
!3. Bibas, supra note I. at 1167 & n.J85 (collecting sources that show that 3G.2"1r• of 
federal defendants in 1999-2000 were charged with drug crimes, 58.9% or !cdcrc.l ii1i11�1tes in 
1998 \VCIT imprisoned for drug-related offenses. and almost a quarter of all ICdcral and state 
inmates are serving sentences ior or awaiting trial on drug crimes). 
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massive discounts for guilty pleas common to most crimes and jurisdictions. 
Federal and many state defendants must now choose between enhancement 
hearings and the massive discounts for pleading to every element. This 
dilemma simply did not exist before Apprendi.14 
Professors King and Klein also overstate how much Apprendi strengthens 
hearings by requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of enhancements. IS 
This supposed benefit is largely illusoty, as legislatures and prosecutors will 
circumvent it. Even if prosecutors fail to prove an enhancement beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow them to try 
to prove it again at sentencing by only a preponderance of the evi dence. This 
use of relevant conduct at sentencing swallows up the reasonable-doubt 
safeguard at tri aJ.1 6 Judges can do more or Jess the same thing under state 
indeterminate-sentencing schemes by using their broad discretion to punish the 
defendant's actual conduct over and above the conduct of conviction. In other 
words, judges who sentence within broad sentencing ranges can look at 
defendants' uncharged behavior i n  deciding where within the range to sentence. 
For example, a judge sentencing an embezzler within a zero-to-twenty-year 
range can impose the maximum sentence on finding that the embezzler 
committed an uncharged murder.1 7 
The only limit on using uncharged conduct at sentencing to circumvent the 
reasonable-doubt standard at trial is set by the statut01y maximum. So where 
statutory maxima are already high, this ntle does l ittle good. Legislatures can 
get around Apprendi's rule simply by raising maxima, which renders Apprendi 
14. This observation is limited to jurisdictions that previously used judicial sentencing 
enhancements to raise statutory maxima. In those states that never had judicial 
enhancements, A.pp,.endi is a non-issue. And in the 21 states that allow bench trials over 
prosecutors' objections. defendants can ask for bench trials to limit enhancements without 
troubling cou11s with jury trials. These bench trials may moderate App,.endi's impact in 
these states. See Bibas. supro note 1, at 1155 n.346, 115R n.354. 
15. Sec King & Klein, supm note l, at 295-96. 
16. Sec Bibas, supro note I, at 1156-57; sec also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148. 
152-57 ( 1997) (per curiam) (holding that a jury's acquittal of one count at trial posed no bar 
to a judge's using the evidence underlying that count to enhance the defendant's sentence 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because judges have long enjoyed latitude to do so 
under indctem1inate sentencing and because the prcponderance-of-thc-evidencc standard at 
sentencing is lower than the rt:asonable-doubt standard at trial): Witte v. United States, 515 
U.S. 389. 397-404 ( 1995); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL�� I 8 1.3. I 81.4 (2000) 
The Court could extend App,.cndi to strike down these provisions of the Guidelines. but only 
Justice Thomas expressed a willingness to do so. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.l l (Thomas . 
.1 .• concurring). It seems unlikely that all five members of the bare majority in ilpprendi 
would be willing to take such a dramatic step. as doing so would effectively abolish the 
whole Guidelines system and invalidate hundreds of thousands, i r not mi i lions, of sentences. 
See Bibas. supra note I, at 1140. 
17. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 562 (Breyer. J., dissenting). ThLiS. the relevant-conduct 
rule in federal detem1inate sentencing formalizes and brings into the open what judges have 
long been able to do under indeterminate sentencing. 
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toothless.IS And, as Professors King and Klein suggest in a footnote, 
prosecutors can get around this rule as well. They need only charge the same 
transaction as a conspiracy plus multiple substantive counts, then stack maxima 
by asking judges to impose multiple consecutive sentences.l9 Any halfway­
clever prosecutor can do so. 
18. The Apprendi majority recognized that legislatures could "hypothetically" evade its 
rule by raising statut01y maxima. The majority thought that "structural democratic 
constraints" would stop legislatures from doing so, but this claim is unconvincing for a 
variety of reasons that I explore in detail in my original article. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 
n. l 6; Bibas, supra note l ,  at 1136-38. Indeed, Professors King and Klein have written 
elsewhere that legislatures are likely to circumvent Apprendi and that the rule in Apprendi 
itself is open to circumvention. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1488-95 (200 I). One need not be a hardened cynic to sec that 
legislatures have some incentive to look tough on crime by trying to counteract A pprendi ' s 
new right, and according to Professors King and Klein they have repeatedly done so in the 
past. !d. My point is not that legislatures should or should not act this way. Rather, in light 
of this historical experience, couns should take this legislative propensity into account when 
considering what form their rules should take. If they are to adopt rules at all, courts should 
try to structure them in such a way that legislatures cannot circumvent them so easily. 
19. Bibas, supra note 1, at 1 !57 & n.353; King & Klein, supra note 1, at 302 n.29. 
Professors King and Klein note some dissension among lower courts on the propriety of this 
tactic, but most reported cases rely on the availability of consecutive sentences to cure any 
Apprendi erTor. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 62 n.4 (1st Cir. 200!) 
(noting that courts have held that any Apprendi errors were not plain where consecutive 
sentences were available); United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 200 I) (per 
curiam) (finding that Apprendi erTor did not prejudice defendant where consecutive 
sentences could have reached the same result); United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 135 
(4th Cir. 200 l ); United States v. Angle, 254 F .3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 200 I) (en bane) (holding 
that any Apprendi en·or did not affect substantial rights because Guidelines would have 
produced same result via consecutive sentences in any event); United States v. Paro1in, 239 
F .3d 922, 930 (7th Cir. 200 l )  (holding that stacked consecutive sentences that effectively 
raised the statutoty maximum did not violate Apprendi); United States v. White, 238 F.3d 
53 7, 542-43 (4th Cir. 200 I) (same as Angle); United States v. Sturgis 238 F.3d 956, 960-61 
(8th Cir. 2001 ); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 543-45 (6th Cir. 2000) (declining to 
notice unprcserved Apprendi error where defendants in any event would have been 
imprisoned for the same period through the imposition of consecutive sentences), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1389 (200 I); State v. Gambrel, No. 2000-CA-29, 2001 WL 85793, at *5-
*7 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. Feb. 2, 2001); People v. Wagener, No. 88843,2001 WL 587044, at 
*10 (Ill June I, 2001); People v. Caruth, 322 Ill. App. 3d 226,2001 WL 599716, at *5 (Ill 
App. Ct. May 31, 200 I) (holding that Apprendi docs not restrict judges' power to determine 
at sentencing whether to run sentences concunently or consecutively); see olso People v. 
Cleveland, 104 Cal Rptr. 2d 641, 645-46 (CaL Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Apprendi does 
not forbid stacking sentences for separate counts consecutively rather than conctl!Tently); 
People v. Martinez, 2001 WL 360836, at *8-1 0 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2001) (holding that 
imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate Apprendi). But c/ United States v. 
Vasquez-Zamora, No. 99-51182, 2001 WL 585127, at *2 (5th Cir. May 31, 200 l )  (holding 
that district court could have reached same result via consecutive sentences but that appellate 
cou11 could not do so in the first instance): United States v. Jones. 23 5 F .3d 123 L 123 8 ( I Oth 
Cir. 2000) (holding that appellate court could not treat Apprendi error as harmless simply 
because trial cour1 could have reached same result via consecutive sentences, but not holding 
that district cour1 could not achieve same result via consecutive sentences on remand). The 
clustering of these cases in federal and a few state cotu1s may indicate that Apprendi has 
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Professors King and Klein further catalogue a number of cases that have 
reduced sentences in the wake of Apprendi. 20 These transitional disruptions do 
not speak to the long-tenn impact of Apprendi on hearings. In other words, this 
new mle gives a short-tenn windfall to some defendants whose sentences 
violated Apprendi. This windfall will not continue now that legislatures, 
prosecutors, and judges know Apprendi's strictures and can circumvent them 
by raising maxima, charging the same transaction in multiple counts, or using 
consecutive sentences.21 Furthermore, Professors King and Klein's focus on 
reported decisions skews the picture. The beneficiaries of Apprendi, who 
persuade courts to reduce sentences, are visible in the appellate reports. The 
victims, who have to enter guilty pleas and forgo hearings, will not enjoy 
judicial fora and hearings. The low-visibility world of plea bargaining may fly 
beneath the radar of reported decisions, but this is no reason to ignore it. 
Finally, Professors King and Klein suggest that my article mistakenly 
exalts judges as "provid[ing] process that is better than the process jury trials 
could provide."22 In the real world of guilty pleas, however, where fewer than 
4% of defendants ever get to juries, this rhetorical invocation of juries is almost 
pointless. The real institutional competition is among judges, prosecutors, and 
legislators, not juries. The jury-based system that grew up to check prosecutors 
no longer works now that juries are all but gone. Prosecutors already have 
plenty of power in charging and sentencing, and one cannot realistically abolish 
this power. The only choices are to leave this power more or less unfettered or 
to give judges countervailing power to check it at sentencing. One does not 
have to worship judges to see that some check on prosecutors is better than 
none. This check need not be in the hands of judges alone. Sentencing 
--------------- ---- -- - - ·--
caused the most disruption in the federal system and a few states such as Illinois, California, 
Colorado, and Ohio, but it is hard to draw solid conclusions from such a small sample size. 
See supra note 14 (discussing why Apprendi will affect some states more severely than 
others). 
These decisions did not tum on the procedural obstacles to raising post-conviction 
claims. Rather, they reasoned that appellate judges should affirm sentences where trial 
judges could and would have used consecutive sentences to achieve the same result in the 
first instance. So these cases pave the way for future prosecutors to charge multiple counts 
and for future trial judges to impose consecutive sentences after Apprendi, allowing them to 
reach the same results as enhancements without using the forbidden enhancement 
mechanism. It is hard to see how the Court could or would extend Apprendi's limit on 
sentencing-enhancement procedures to plug this loophole by regulating charging practices 
and concurrent and consecutive sentences. 
20. King & Klein, supru note 1, at 300 n.23. 
21. Perhaps the Court will at some point in the future come up with a rule that 
regulates these practices, but Apprendi itself does not do so. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 
n.l6 (acknowledging that legislatures could ''hypothetically" evade the Apprendi rule by 
raising maxima). Given the slender one-vote majority in Apprendi, it seems unlikely that the 
Court will extend Apprendi t�u· enough to regulate prosecutors' traditionally unreviewable 
charging discretion and legislatures' almost unfettered latitude to set maximum sentences. 
n. King & Klein, supra note 1, at 310. 
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commissions, probation and parole officers, and appellate courts can also 
contribute to real-offense sentencing, keeping both prosecutors and j udges 
honest. To make this scheme work, l egislatures should simplify the thicket of 
duplicative statutory offenses, minima, and maxima-not the venerable 
gradations set up by the common law, such as the ancient distinction between 
murder and manslaughter, b ut the fi ne and somewhat arbitrary distinctions 
drawn by thousands of modem statutes.23 There is plenty of room to prune 
back the complexity of the criminal law toward the simplicity it had decades or 
centuries ago.24 This step would l imit prosecutors '  power to dictate sentences 
by charge bargaining and give j udges more power to check them. In the real 
world of guilty pleas, the key is to give j udges and other actors enough room to 
counterbalance prosecutors, lest prosecutors alone run the show. 
23. See Ashe v. Swenson, 3 9 7  U . S  436, 445 n. l O  ( 1 97 0 )  (bemoaning the move fro m  a 
few distinc t  categories of offenses at common law to the recent "extraordin ary pro l i feration 
of overlapping and related statutory o ffenses, [which has a l lowed] prosecutors t o  sp in out  a 
start l ingly numerous series of o ffenses from a s ingle a l l eged cri m i na l  transac t ion"); see also 
Albert W. A lschu l cr. The Prosecutor 's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. C H I .  L. REV. 50,  77-
7 8  ( 1 96 8 )  ( acknowledging that ··the dist in ctions drawn by the criminal code . . .  sometimes 
prove too fi ne for workable,  everyday app l i cation" and suggesting that the solution is  
"simpl i fication of the criminal  code to retlect ' everyday real ity ' rather than common- law 
refinement'') .  I ndeed, Professor K le in  hers e l f  has cr i t ic ized t h e  "drast ic" growth of 
·'thousands" of overlapping cri m i na l  statutes, which has given prosecutors too m uch power 
to overcharge and pursue success i ve prosecutions.  See Susan R .  K l e i n  & Kather ine P. 
C h i are l l o. Successive Prosecutions ond Compound Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 
TEX. L .  REV. 3 3 3 .  3 5 8-60 ( 1 99 8 ) .  
2 4 .  Professors King a n d  K l e i n  p o i n t  to benefits t h a t  tl o w  from grading offenses, but  we 
could reap most of these benetits by having legis latures out l ine culpab i l i ty factors rather than 
rigid maxima, or having sentenc ing commiss ions set up more flex i b l e  grades as part of a 
real-offense system. There are many ways to achieve these benefits, and i n  t h i s  footnote I 
can sketch only a few suggested methods. F i rst, legis l a tures could draft sentencing 
enhancements designed to evade Apprendi, by for example setting h igh m a x i m a  and then 
des ign at ing facts that, if found by sentenci n g  j udges,  would l ower those maxima.  Second, 
legislatures ( or sentencing commissions ) could set forth factors and criteria that should guide 
sentencing d iscretion. much as they already do in  capital sentenc ing . J u dges, rather than 
apply ing mathematical fonm!l ac. woul d  weigh and balance these criteria and g i ve reasoned 
exp lanations of why the factors and criteria l ed them to panicular sentences. T h i rd, unless 
and unt i l the Court extends Apprendi to scntenc ing guide l i nes. sentencing c o m missions can 
cont inue to usc guide l ine cnhancements to tai lor punishment to defendant s '  real offenses, 
checking prosecutors · power to di ctate sentences through their charging and plea-bargaining 
decisions. 
